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Abstract: Access to finance is a prerequisite for economic development. 
Existing studies measure access by the use of finance. We develop a direct 
measurement for access to finance from the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey 2005 data. We determine whether a firm 
without a loan does not need one or is indeed credit-constrained. The 
determinants of access estimated in a Heckman selection model are 
compared with those of use. Our results show that firm age and sector 
effects do not influence access although they are significant in the use 
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  11. Introduction  
It is a well-established fact that access to finance is a major determinant of economic 
growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000).
1 In the current 
financial crisis, financially constrained firms do not invest (Campello, Graham, Harvey, 
2009). Therefore, access to finance, which has been one of the core topics in 
development for quite some time (see, for instance, Claessens, 2006; World Bank, 2008), 
came on the agenda of basically all governments. The important policy question is: which 
measures must be taken to foster access to finance?  
A prerequisite to answer this question is to know which factors determine access to 
finance. In reality, it is however difficult to measure access to finance. In many studies, 
the use of finance is taken as a proxy for access to finance. This approach, however, 
neglects that those firms that do not use loans can be firms that either do not have access 
(and were denied loans) or that they do not need loans. For analyzing access only the first 
group is relevant, i.e. those that do not get a loan despite they have demand. This implies 
that studying the factors affecting access to loans by studying the use of loans may be 
misleading.  
We derive a direct measure of access to loans. Our analysis uses the BEEPS 
(Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey) data, which are based on a 
survey conducted in 2005 among 9655 firms in 27 countries in Europe and Central Asia. 
This data set provides a unique source of information because firms are not only asked 
whether they have a bank loan or not, but if a firm does not have a bank loan, it gives 
reasons for it. The reasons are either that it does not get access or that it does not need a 
loan (which is the case for about one third of the total population of firms in our sample). 
For the first time, we can directly measure access to loans. This new measures allow us to 
study the true determinants of access.  
To highlight the differences between access and use we analyze the determinants of 
both (measures?). We perform different probit regressions with the aim to identify 
whether the determinants of use and access are different. We start with estimating the 
                                                 
1   For developing countries, there are several studies that use either policy changes or controlled 
experiments to estimate the effect of credit constraints on firm performance (for a survey, see Beck and 
Demirgüc-Kunt, 2008). 
  2determinants of use. Then, we do the same for access to loans. For access we take two 
different approaches. First, we restrict our sample to those firms that need loans and study 
which explanatory variables determine access. Second, we perform two-stage regressions 
in which, on the first stage, we model demand for loans and, on the second stage, we 
model access. Finally, we compare the significance of determinants in the different 
specifications. 
Our empirical analysis shows that there exist three major differences in the 
determinants for use and access both on the firm and on the country level. First, the most 
substantial differences appear for the firm’s sector. Despite controlling for a wide range 
of determinants, firms from many sectors have a smaller probability of using a loan. The 
access analysis shows, however, that assuming restriction in access to loans is mostly 
misleading as the reduced probability is often due to differences in demand. Second, we 
find that firm age matters for the use of finance but not for access to finance. The reason 
is that firms in a particular age group have less demand for loans and therefore appear 
more likely to be credit-constrained in a model in which use of loans is the dependent 
variable. The regressions for access show, that this is mainly caused by demand and not 
by a higher probability for being credit-constrained. Third, we show that among the 
country-specific factors, the protection of creditor rights is only significant for explaining 
access and not use. And that foreign bank presence does not improve access although it 
increases use. 
Our results show that taking use of loans as a proxy for access to loans can be 
misleading in many respects. This finding has important policy implications. In 
particular, with respect to sectors we see that some sectors have a much lower use of 
loans simply because they do not need loans. When studying access to loans they do not 
face more constraints than other sectors. Given the distortions in financial intermediation 
caused by the current crisis many firms/ sectors demand financial support from the 
government. If this support was provided in form of easier access to loans, sector-specific 
programs will be very inefficient, unless they are based on data that adequately measure 
access to finance. Therefore, we want to emphasize how important it is to possess data 
about access to finance before policy measures are taken. 
  3In contrast to the existing literature we directly measure access and do not proxy for 
it. Previous approximated measures for access are loans or debt relative to total assets or 
loans to total debt. Our measure of access takes into account whether a firm that needs a 
loan gets a loan. Thus, firms that do not need a loan and therefore do not have a loan are 
not lumped together with firms that are denied access. Thereby, we use more information 
than all other measures do, which allows us comparing whether the determinants of use 
of finance indeed influence access to finance.  
In the existing literature, the firms’ financial situation is evaluated by using balance-
sheet data and by surveying the firms. Investigating the balance-sheet provides 
information which sources of finance are actually used and the extent of use. Balance-
sheet data can be used to measure whether a firm is financially constrained, for instance, 
by studying the sensitivity of investment to cash flows (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, 
1988). However, there is a big debate about this approach (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 
2000) just as it is for other approaches, such as Tobin’s q. Sometimes information from 
the annual report indicates that financial constraints exist because firms cannot fulfill 
covenants. Since reliable balance-sheets are needed, this approach is most appropriate 
when studying big corporations. For small- and medium enterprises (SMEs) data 
availability is often an issue. Alternatively, data from surveys can be used. For instance, 
the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in many 
emerging and developing economies asks how problematic access to financing and cost 
of financing are for the operation and the growth of a firm.
2  
Our paper is related to the literature on access to finance and how it is determined by 
firm- and country-specific characteristics. In this literature a variety of data sources are 
used. On the firm level, most studies include ownership and size as explanatory variables. 
Interestingly, the results on these determinants are ambiguous. Some studies find that 
small firms use loans more intensively (Giannetti and Ongena, 2008 using loans/ total 
assets from balance sheets data as dependent variable) while other obtain the opposite 
result (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008 using bank loan/ total finance from 
survey data and Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2008 using total debt/ assets from survey 
                                                 
2  Campello, Graham, Harvey (2009) ask firms whether they perceived themselves financially 
constrained. However, they focus on the effect of financial constraints on firm behavior. 
  4data). The same is true for ownership where only Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2008) 
find that state-owned firms use loans more intensively. Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2005) use survey data where firms assess how much access to finance is an 
obstacle for their growth. Interestingly, access to finance is perceived as more difficult by 
small and state-owned firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic., 2005). 
On the country level, the results are less ambiguous. It is generally agreed that better 
protection of creditor rights increases the use of finance (Giannetti and Ongena, 2008, 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008, Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2008). 
When investigating the legal provisions made to protect creditor rights and the quality of 
the legal system that can be used to enforce these rights, they are complements (Safavian 
and Sharma, 2007). The results on the impact of information show that the results may 
depend on the type of measure for access to finance. When access is measured by 
perceived access, the existence of information sharing arrangements increases access to 
finance for all firms. However, if the dependent variable is total debt/ assets information 
sharing affects only small firms and those firms in countries with weak creditor rights 
(Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2008).  
We contribute to the literature on access to loans by deriving for the first time a direct 
measure of access. Since we can contrast the factors determining access with those 
determining use, we can see can evaluate whether the policy measured discussed so far, 
which are based on measuring the use of loans, are appropriate to foster access to loans. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our data set and the 
methodology. The results from the empirical analysis are presented in section 3. In the 
empirical analysis we discriminate between firm and country-specific determinants of 
access to finance. We conclude in section 4. 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
We use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The 
BEEPS intends to assess the environment for private enterprise and business 
development. We use the survey that was conducted in March and April 2005. The 
  5survey covers 27 countries in Europe and Central Asia. Per country between 200 and 
about 500 firms were interviewed, depending on the size of the country. We leave out 
data from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as information about institutional characteristics of 
these countries are missing and answers might be distorted for political reasons. We also 
leave out Turkey because it is not a transition country. So finally we analyze 6659 firms 
in 24 transition countries.  
[Table I] 
 
The questionnaire has information about the general characteristics of the firm and a 
whole section about its financing. In this section firms are asked about the most recent 
loan. Table I shows how the answers are distributed. In our sample 56% of all firms have 
a loan, 44% do not have one. If the firm does not currently have a loan, it can provide 
different reasons for it. About 4 % of the firms were rejected, 94% even have not applied 
for a loan and for 2% the application are still pending. In addition, firms which did not 
apply for a loan were asked for the reasons. The answers could be summarized in two 
different categories. First, the firm did not apply for the following reasons: collateral 
requirements are too strict, interest rates are too high or informal payments need to be 
made to obtain a loan. We call them discouraged firms. Second, a firm actually did not 
need a loan. This differentiation is essential for the following analysis.  
 
2.1. Dependent Variables 
We have two different dependent binary variables, use and access. The difference 
between these two dependent variables is depicted in Figure 1.  
[Figure I] 
 
Use is equal to 1 if a firm has a loan and 0 otherwise. This measure is equivalent to 
former studies analyzing the use of finance. This method does not differentiate between 
firms that are financially constrained and firms that actually have no demand for a loan. 
  6To study access to finance, only firms with demand for a loan should be examined. 
Therefore we need to identify those firms. Accordingly the binary variable demand 
equals 1 for the following three cases:
3
−  the firm has a loan [1] 
−  the firm does not have a loan because its application was turned down[2]  
−  the firm does not have a loan because it was discouraged [3] 
The last group of firms did not apply for a loan, but since these firms need a loan 
they are integrated here.  
Finally, demand is 0 if the firm does not have a loan because it has no need for a loan 
and therefore has not applied [4]. The number of firms whose application is still pending 
is very small and as it is unclear whether they will get access or not, we do not use this 
data.  
To analyze access to finance we account only for those firms which have demand for 
loans (demand=1). Therefore the variable access is 1 if the firm has a loan (and by 
definition has demand). Access is 0 if it does not have a loan although it has demand for 
it; this means that the group consists of firms that applied for a loan but have been 
rejected and of discouraged firms. 
Summarizing, we can say that the measure use of finance does not discriminate 
within the “use=0” group between firms that applied for a loan and have been rejected, 
firms that did not apply for a loan, because they were discouraged, and firms that do not 




We study whether the determinants of access and use are the same, i.e. whether the 
determinants of use are good proxies for access to loans. Therefore, we perform probit 
estimations for use and access separately and then compare the statistical and economic 
significance of the coefficients. 
                                                 
3  Ideally, we would like to discriminate firms with demand further into those that are creditworthy 
and those that are not creditworthy. However, such a differentiation is very difficult to be done in practice. 
There is one study in which a bank newly entering the market evaluated the creditworthiness of households 
(Johnson and Murdoch, 2008) 
  7     Pr(accessi=1|xi)= Φ(xi'α+vi)     (1) 
     P r ( u s e i=1|xi)= Φ(xi'β+wi)     (2) 
with xi– vector of covariates for firm i, α and β – vectors of coefficients and vi , wi – 
random disturbance for firm i. 
In the estimation of access we restrict our sample to those firms with demand for 
loans (demand=1). Through such a restriction valuable information gets lost. Moreover, 
selection into the sample group “demand for credit” might not be random and 
unmeasured variables could influence the decision of a firm to demand a loan. This 
selectivity would bias the coefficients in the access estimation. Therefore, we make use 
of all the available information and control for possible selection bias by performing a 
Heckman selection model. On the first stage, we estimate the demand for loans. On the 
second stage, we estimate access to loans given that the firm has demand. The results 
complement what we find for the comparison for the specifications of use and access. 
The determinants of access to finance can be classified into two broad groups: firm-
specific and country-specific factors. We describe the variables used in our model in the 
following two subsections. 
 
2.3 Firm level explanatory variables 
From the policy debate and the existing evidence there are several important firm-
specific characteristics that may influence access to finance. These include size, age and 
ownership of the firm. With respect to size different effects interact. On the one hand, the 
banks' costs for conducting a credit evaluation do not vary a lot with the amount of the 
loan. Thus, smaller loans are less profitable for banks and therefore banks might be 
reluctant to lend to small firms. On the other hand, there is a diversification effect by 
granting many small loans. The dummy variable small-firm controls for the size of a firm, 
it equals to 1 if the number of employees is less than 50. 
Firm age should influence the demand for loans because, depending on the stage of 
development of the firm, financial needs differ and so do the alternative sources of 
finance available. For newly founded firms the information asymmetries a creditor faces 
are most severe. Older firms already have a track record and can (ideally) show that they 
  8always repaid on time. To measure the effect of age, we use the dummy variables for the 
following age categories: 0 – 5 years, 6 – 15 years, 16 – 30 years, 31 years or more. 
Firms can try to reduce the information asymmetries the investors face by becoming 
more  transparent, for instance, through reporting their balance-sheets according to 
international accounting standards and having them audited by a renounced auditing 
company.
  The variable transparency takes the value 0 if a firm does neither use 
international accounting standards nor external auditors, it takes the value 1 if at least one 
of them is used and the value 2 if both are used.
4
In transition countries the ownership structure has some special features. After the 
demise of the socialist system basically all firms were state-owned. Since then many of 
the firms were privatized with the aim to render them more efficient. From this point of 
view, they should be better debtors. However, if state-owned firms have a soft budget 
constraint, they will not fail and therefore the bank does not face a risk financing them. 
The effect of ownership structure is captured with the two dummy variable privatized-
firm  and state-owned-firm.  Privatized-firm  equals 1 if the firm was established by 
privatization of a state-owned firm and 0 for an originally private firm.
 5
Moreover, the chance to get a loan depends on the firm’s default risk. We capture it 
by two more explanatory variables: a dummy whether a firm is profitable or not and a 
dummy whether it made an investment during the last 36 months. So the dummy variable 
profit is 1 if the firm realized profits in 2003 and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable 
investment equals to 1 if new production technologies were acquired in the last 36 months 
and 0 otherwise.  
Also the sector which a firm operates in plays an important role because, depending 
on the nature of the firm's business, the need for financing might change substantially. 
For instance, the size of investments is much higher in manufacturing than in retail. Thus, 
the demand for loans might strongly depend on the firm's sector. However, we expect 
that  access to loans depends on firm-specific rather than sector-specific factors. We 
                                                 
4  The degree of transparency is determined by firms' choices within regulatory limits. However in 
the following analysis it is treated as an exogenous variable, referring to robustness checks by Brown, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2008) They control for potential endogeneity using instrumental variables estimations 
and show that analysis of Cost and Use of Finance using BEEPS data do not change. 
5  Thus, we our basic covariates are similar to those Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2008) who use 
data from an earlier wave (2002) of the BEEPS survey. In this round, however, firms were not asked why 
they do not have a loan. 
  9control for different sector characteristics, using dummy variables which equals to 1 if 
more than 95 percent of the sales of a company comes from this sector. The sectors are 
mining and quarrying (sector 1), construction (sector 2), manufacturing (sector 3), 
transportation, storage and communication (sector 4), wholesale, retail and repairs (sector 
5), real estate, renting and business services (sector 6), hotels and restaurants (sector 7). 
Table III summarizes the firm-level explanatory variables. 
[Table III] 
 
2.4. Country level explanatory variables 
The second group of determinants are country-specific factors. In this respect 
particularly important is the legal framework. It shapes the credit contracts that 
potentially can be designed through two channels. The first channel is the protection of 
creditor rights as codified in the law. The better creditor rights are protected, the more 
likely banks are willing to provide loans (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silianes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998). The second channel is how well the protection of creditor rights is indeed 
enforced (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000). We capture the first channel by the creditor 
rights index constructed by Doing Business. It measures the degree to which collateral 
and bankruptcy laws protect the right of borrowers and lenders and ranges between 1 and 
10. A higher score facilitates lending and therefore leads to better access to finance. For 
the second channel we use the effectiveness of legal institutions as measured by the days 
it takes to enforce a contract. 
Credit markets are subject to substantial problems of asymmetric information which 
are most severe in emerging markets. Information sharing devices such as credit 
registries are an important mechanism to reduce information asymmetries by providing 
information on, for instance, whether a firm has defaulted on a loan previously. Thus, 
their existence should make access easier, in particular, for more opaque firms.
6 Here we 
use an index developed by Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2008). This index measures the 
presence and structure of public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The value 
                                                 
6   There is a rich theoretical literature on the effects of information sharing on the behavior of 
borrowers and ultimately on the credit market (for a survey see Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2008). Not in 
all models information sharing has positive effects on access to credit. The effects depend crucially on the 
incentive problem studied in the model. 
  10ranges from 1 to 5, the more detailed the information provided are and the longer the 
registry has existed the higher is the scale. 
The effect of foreign bank presence on access to finance is controversial. On the one 
hand, foreign banks bring expertise and capital into the host market which might improve 
access to finance. On the other hand, it is argued that foreign banks might focus on 
particularly lucrative projects, that are easily identifiable because they are transparent. As 
foreign bank entry affects the behavior of domestic banks, they could start lending to 
more opaque firms (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004).
7 We capture the presence of 
foreign banks by the market share of foreign-owned banks (among all bank assets). 
Moreover, we use as explanatory variable the income level measured by the log of 
the gross national income (logGNI), inflation measured by the GDP deflator. Table IV 




3. Empirical Results: Access versus Use 
We first report the results for use because this is what is measured in other papers and 
thus is our point of reference. Next, we report the results for access. By comparing the 
results, we can highlight the differences. We show coefficient estimates because we are 
interested in the implied direction of the effects. Throughout the paper we use robust 
standard errors. 
 
3.1. Firm-specific factors 
We first investigate the firm-specific factors influencing the use of loans (Table V). 
This is done in a probit regression where we next to firm-specific factors and sectors 
dummies use country dummies to control for differences between the 24 countries in our 
dataset. The results show that small and state-owned firms are less likely to have loans. In 
                                                 
7    Empricial evidence on the effects of foreign bank entry is mixed. Giannetti and Ongena (2008) 
find that in Eastern Europe larger firms benefit more from foreign bank presence. Detriagache, Tressel and 
Gupta (2008) show in a sample with low income countries that financial intermediation decreases in 
foreign bank penetration. Gormley (2009)’s results on India indicate that, on average, firms are less likely 
to receive a loan after foreign bank entry. 
  11contrast, more transparent firms are more likely to use loans and so are firms that were 
profitable in 2003. Age effects are not significant. Moreover, all the sector dummies are 
negative and significant. Thus, they all use loans less often than those in the basic 
category, which is mining and quarrying.  
Next, we run the same regression with access to loans as a dependent variable. With 
respect to the firm-specific variable we find that small firms and state-owned firms less 
often have access and that transparent and (in 2003) profitable firms more often have 
access. With respect to the sector-specific effects, only firms in real estate, renting and 
business services (sector 6) have less access to loans than in the base sector.  
These results already highlight the substantial differences in the determinants of use 
and access. With respect to the firm-specific variable we find almost the same variables 
to be significant as in both regressions. However, the results for the sector-specific 
determinants change fundamentally. Comparing the results for use of loans and access to 
loans implies that the demand for loans must differ significantly between sectors. 
However, given that there is demand banks do not base their decision to grant a loan on 
the firm's sector – with the exception of real estate, renting and business services (sector 
6). For them, it is more difficult to get access.   
[Table V] 
 
3.2. Country-specific factors 
For the analysis of firm-specific factors we captured differences between countries 
by country dummies. In order to investigate which determinants on the country level 
matter, we replace them by country-specific factors (Table VI). The first result is that in 
both the use and the access regression the significant firm-specific determinants are 
nearly the same as above. The only exception is firm age. It remains insignificant in the 
access regression but in the use regression firms in the age cohorts 0 – 5 and 16 – 30 are 
less likely to have a loan. 
For the use of loans the parameters for GNI and inflation are not significant. 
Moreover, measures of the legal environment, protection of creditor rights and the time it 
takes to enforce a contract are not significant. However, foreign bank presence increases 
the use of loans. We find that information sharing is positive and significant. We also 
  12study whether particular groups of firms profit more strongly, by interacting information 
sharing with a small firm dummy, an opaque firm dummy (if transparency is smaller than 
2) and a dummy for weak protection of creditor rights (if the creditor rights index is 
smaller than 6). The interaction effect between information sharing and the small firm 
dummy is insignificant, while the interaction with weak creditor rights is significant and 
negative. Thus, small firms do not benefit more from information sharing than others, 
firms from countries with a weak protection of creditor rights however benefit less from 
better information sharing. In contrast, the interaction with a dummy for opaque firms is 
positive and significant. This positive interaction effect implies that in countries that have 
information sharing arrangements in place access is easier for opaque firms.  
For access to loans GNI is insignificant and inflation has a negative impact. Foreign 
bank presence does not matter. For the legal system, we find a positive coefficient of 
creditor rights, but the time it takes to enforce contracts is insignificant. Information 
sharing is positive and significant in all regressions (expect when interacted with an 
opaque firm dummy). Only the interaction effect between information sharing and the 
opaque dummy is significant and positive.  
Thus, also on the country level there are some differences in the determinants of use 
and access. Inflation negatively influences access but does not matter for use. In contrast 
to the results for use, foreign bank presence does not affect access. A better protection of 
creditor rights improves access but does not matter for use. Information sharing is 
significant in the use and the access regression. However, the interaction effect with weak 
creditor rights protection is significant and negative only in the use regression. This result 
would imply that firm in countries with weak protection of creditor rights and adequate 
information sharing use loans less often than in countries with better creditor rights. 
However, since the interaction effect is insignificant in the access regression the lower 
probability of having a loan (due to weak creditor rights) can not be explained by 
constraints of access to finance. 
[Table VI ] 
 
3.3. Heckman Selection Model 
  13The comparison of results for use and access already shows that there are significant 
differences in their respective determinants. We want to explain these differences more 
rigorously. Therefore, we use a maximum-likelihood probit model with sample selection. 
We estimate the demand for a loan in a first selection equation and access to loans in a 
second outcome equation performing a Heckman selection model. The selection equation 
is:  
    demandi=1(zi' γ + ui  >   0 )       ( 3 )  
with  zi– vector of covariates for firm i ,  γ – vector of coefficients and ui – random 
disturbance for firm i in the selection equation. 
And the outcome equation: 
    Pr(accessi=1|xi,)= Φ(xi'δ+ei)      (4) 
with  xi– vector of covariates for firm i,  δ – vector of coefficients and ei – random 
disturbance for firm i in the outcome equation. 
To specify the demand equation we use the firm-specific determinants age, ownership 
structure, size and profitability equivalent to the use and access regression and 
additionally include the variable competition as an exclusion restriction. Competition 
should influence the demand for loans because with more competition firms may have 
lower retained earnings and therefore need more loans. Moreover, they may invest more 
often. However, banks should base their decision to grant a loan on harder information, in 
particular, on figures that are observable in the firm’s balance sheet.  
To measure the competitive environment firms were asked what would happen if 
they raised the prices of their main product line or main line of services by 10 percent in 
the domestic market. The variable competition takes the value 1 if customers would 
continue to buy the same quantities, 2 if they would buy a slightly reduced quantity, 3 if 
they would buy a much lower quantity and lastly 4 if many buyers would switch and buy 
from the competitor instead. 
When the correlation between the error terms ei of the outcome equation and the error 
terms ui of the selection equation is zero, probit regression provides unbiased estimates. 
Otherwise the estimators are biased. 
Table VII shows the results of the Heckman selection model that controls for 
selectivity bias. The Wald test of independent equation rejects the Ho hypothesis that the 
  14correlation between the error terms is zero at a 1 percent significance level. This means 
that it is necessary to use a sample selection model.  
In the demand regression, we find that firms in the age group 16-30 years have a 
lower probability of demand than firms in the base group (31+). Small firms in terms of 
employment are less likely to demand a loan. Firms that face more competition and those 
that invested in a new production technology are also more likely to demand a loan. The 
firm's profitability is negative and significant in this regression implying that firms that 
were profitable in 2003 have less likely demand for a loan. The sector dummies are 
particularly interesting. We see that all sectors except sector 2 (construction) less often 
have demand for loans than the base sector, mining and quarrying.  
On the second stage, for access to finance the results for the firm-specific results are 
similar to what we obtained before. Here, small and state-owned firms are less likely to 
have access but transparent firms are more likely. Past profitability significantly 
alleviates access. However, neither age groups nor sector dummies are significant.  
On the country level, our results show that better protection of creditor rights 
increases access to loans while better enforcement is insignificant. Moreover, foreign 
bank presence is not significant. The measure for information sharing is significant in the 
base regression and when interacted with a small firm dummy or a dummy for weak 
creditor rights, but there the interactions effects are insignificant. The interaction effect of 
information sharing with opaque firms is positive and significant at the 11.7 percent 
level, but information sharing itself becomes insignificant implying that only opaque 
firms benefit from information sharing. 
[Insert Table VII] 
 
When comparing the access in the one-stage and the two-stage model we do not find 
difference between the country-specific results. The biggest differences arise between 
these two approaches with regards to sector-specific results. While in the one-stage 
model for access we find significant differences between sectors they disappear in a two-
stage model. The results of the first stage of the Heckman selection model suggest that 
firms in all other six sectors demand loans less often than in the base sector. Thus, the 
  15difference between the one-stage and the two-stage model are due to differences in 
demand.  
 
3.4. Access Versus Use 
When comparing access and use we find several important differences. First, with 
respect to the firm-specific effects there are differences for the age effects. We show that 
firms in the age categories 0 - 10 and 16 - 30 years use loans less often. But for access 
they do not differ from other firms. At least for firms in the cohort 16 - 30 years we find 
that this is due to less frequent demand. We run regression with different definitions of 
age groups and find that the coefficients of the individual age groups depend on their 
definition. But what we can see in general is that age groups less often are significant in 
the regression for access (in particular in the Heckman selection model) than for use.  
Second, the biggest difference exists for the sector dummies. Here again the use of 
loans in a sector is driven by demand and sector-specific effects do not matter for access. 
Thus, our results also show that using sector dummy in the use regression does not 
provide consistent estimates for analysis of access. 
Third, with respect to country-specific variables, we show that better creditor rights 
improve access. But they do not make the use of loans more likely. For foreign bank 
presence, the results are reversed. Firms are more likely to have a loan in countries with 
higher foreign bank presence but it does not improve access. Information sharing is 




We started this paper with the question whether the use of finance is a good 
approximation for access to finance and, in particular, whether the factors determining 
use and access, respectively, are the same. We show that the results with access as the 
dependent variable in a one-stage regression and the results of a two-step Heckman 
selection model are similar. However, our results indicate that there are major differences 
between the determinants of use and access, respectively. The differences are most 
  16pronounced with respect to effects of firm age, sector-specific effects and the role of 
foreign banks and creditor rights protection (on the country level).  
The age effects are insignificant in the access regression of the Heckman selection 
model. For firms between 16 – 30 years the negative coefficient in the use regression is 
due to the fact that they significantly less often demand a loan. Our analysis thus suggests 
that age does not influence access, at least for our sample which, of course, has some 
particularities because many firms were founded after transition started in 1989.  
What does our analysis suggest for governments? With respect to reforms on the 
country level improving the protection of creditor rights and implementation of 
information sharing devises are appropriate measures. These measures are particularly 
important for developing countries where these institutions are still deficient.  
What can be done by targeting firm-specific aspects of access? Our most 
important policy conclusion is probably that information about the use of loans is not 
enough to identify either the type of firms that should be supported or the reforms that 
should be undertaken on the country level. Our results also show that sector-specific 
programs to improve access do not make sense, at least in “normal” times.  
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  19APPENDIX
Table I: Descriptive Statics - Sample
Firms, that Freq. Percent
do not have a loan 4.794 56,29
have a loan 3.722 43,71
Total 8.516 100
If the the firm does not have a loan, what was the reason? Freq. Percent
Firm did not apply for a loan 4.487 93,6
Application was turned down 220 4,59
Application for the loan is still pending 87 1,81
Total 4.794 100
If firm did not apply, what were the main reasons? Freq. Percent
Does not need a loan 2936 48,11
Application preocedures for bank loans are too burdensome 798 13,08
Collateral requirements for bank loans are too strict 842 13,80
Interest rates are too high 1183 19,38
It is necessary to make informal payments to get bank loans 98 1,61
Did not think it would be approved 141 2,31
Others 105 1,72
Total 6103 100
If firm did not apply, what were the main reasons? Freq. Percent
At least one answer is "does not need a loan"  2936 65,43
None of the answers is "does not need a loan" 1551 34,57
Total 4487 100
19Table II: Descriptive Statistics
Different  groups of firms use demand access Freq. Percent
firm has a loan 1 1 1 3722 44.16
firm does not have a loan, because application turned down 0 1 0 220 2.61
firm does not have a loan, because discouraged from applying 0 1 0 1551 18.40










20Table III: Descriptive Statistics: Firm Characteristics
country transition firm post-transition 
firm
small firm privatized firm state-owned 
firm
transparency profit competition investment
Albania 0,22 0,72 0,74 0,08 0,09 0,99 0,92 2,50 0,40
Armenia 0,11 0,63 0,78 0,31 0,06 0,71 0,97 2,46 0,53
Azerbaijan 0,08 0,78 0,68 0,07 0,11 0,68 0,99 2,64 0,50
Belarus 0,21 0,62 0,71 0,05 0,12 0,48 0,85 2,45 0,28
Bosnia 0,08 0,62 0,61 0,18 0,10 0,76 0,79 2,55 0,45
Bulgaria 0,30 0,51 0,74 0,14 0,10 0,66 0,78 2,54 0,28
Croatia 0,35 0,38 0,65 0,21 0,11 1,08 0,96 2,57 0,43
Czech Rep. 0,38 0,55 0,76 0,07 0,09 0,41 0,91 2,45 0,23
Estonia 0,37 0,54 0,74 0,12 0,09 1,68 0,89 2,52 0,19
Georgia 0,08 0,64 0,74 0,26 0,12 1,15 0,74 2,61 0,28
Hungary 0,39 0,46 0,72 0,10 0,04 0,88 0,85 2,91 0,15
Kazakhstan 0,14 0,76 0,73 0,19 0,07 0,43 0,87 2,38 0,31
Kyrgyz Rep. 0,14 0,57 0,63 0,36 0,11 0,83 0,78 2,65 0,43
Latvia 0,22 0,65 0,74 0,10 0,11 0,86 0,69 2,31 0,25
Lithuania 0,29 0,53 0,68 0,17 0,13 0,65 0,75 2,79 0,29
Macedonia 0,22 0,53 0,73 0,16 0,09 0,49 0,80 2,66 0,31
Moldova 0,17 0,71 0,65 0,22 0,06 0,23 0,62 2,50 0,38
Poland 0,31 0,42 0,75 0,07 0,06 0,45 0,88 2,83 0,34
Romania 0,36 0,53 0,65 0,11 0,06 0,59 0,83 2,40 0,41
Russia 0,16 0,70 0,67 0,12 0,10 0,48 0,88 2,30 0,31
Serbia 0,25 0,45 0,65 0,13 0,14 0,92 0,79 2,06 0,36
Slovak Rep. 0,36 0,51 0,68 0,06 0,11 0,65 0,87 2,66 0,23
Slovenia 0,39 0,29 0,71 0,19 0,11 0,58 0,74 2,47 0,29
Ukraine 0,18 0,64 0,71 0,15 0,10 0,49 0,83 2,31 0,31
21Table IV: Descriptive Statistics - Country Characteristics
country information 
sharing
GNI inflation foreignbank creditrights enforcement 
days
Albania 0 2580 3,49 92,3 9 390
Armenia 0 1470 3,17 48,7 4 285
Azerbaijan 0 1270 16,14 6,6 7 267
Belarus 0 2760 16,6 16,2 4 225
Bosnia 0 2680 1,4 90,9 4 595
Bulgaria 0,8 3510 3,76 74,5 6 564
Croatia 0 8350 3,19 91,2 5 561
Czech Rep. 0 11150 0,68 84,4 6 820
Estonia 4 9530 6,79 99,4 4 425
Georgia 0 1300 8,27 75,9 5 375
Hungary 3,8 10210 2,01 82,6 6 335
Kazakhstan 3,6 2940 17,87 7,3 5 230
Kyrgyz Rep. 0 450 7,13 73,6 4 177
Latvia 0 6760 10,18 57,9 8 279
Lithuania 4,6 6910 5,77 91,7 4 210
Macedonia 2 2830 3,27 51,3 6 509
Moldova 0 960 9,35 19,6 6 365
Poland 0 7150 2,58 74,3 4 980
Romania 0,6 3830 12,29 59,2 5 537
Russia 0 4470 19,19 8,3 3 281
Serbia 0 2190 15,12 66 3 1028
Slovak Rep. 1,2 8100 2,37 97,3 9 565
Slovenia 2,8 17430 1,47 22,6 6 1350
Ukraine 0 1540 24,66 21,3 8 354
Total 0,95 5042 9,28 53,84 5,29 503
Source of logGNI and inflation: World Bank, DDP quick query; foreignbank: EBRD, 
Structural and institutional change indicators; creditrights and log_enfdays: Doing Business; 
Information sharing: Brown et al. (2008) 
22Table V: Firm-specific Results
use access
Robust Robust
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
age 0-5 -0,104 0,075 0,162 -0,044 0,100 -0,440 0,660
age 5-15 -0,004 0,063 0,945 0,088 0,086 1,010 0,311
age 15-30 -0,127 0,078 0,106 -0,055 0,106 -0,520 0,601
small firm -0,495 *** 0,041 0,000 -0,719 *** 0,058 -12,370 0,000
privatized firm 0,011 0,055 0,848 0,042 0,077 0,540 0,587
state-owned firm -0,556 *** 0,071 0,000 -0,490 *** 0,100 -4,910 0,000
transparency 0,185 *** 0,027 0,000 0,301 *** 0,038 7,940 0,000
profit 0,221 *** 0,046 0,000 0,412 *** 0,058 7,160 0,000
sec2 -0,140 ** 0,067 0,037 -0,135 0,088 -1,530 0,126
sec3 -0,092 ** 0,044 0,035 -0,061 0,056 -1,090 0,277
sec4 -0,179 ** 0,079 0,023 -0,079 0,105 -0,760 0,449
sec5 -0,191 *** 0,048 0,000 -0,017 0,064 -0,270 0,784
sec6 -0,551 *** 0,071 0,000 -0,304 *** 0,097 -3,140 0,002
sec7 -0,489 *** 0,086 0,000 -0,123 0,127 -0,970 0,330
_cons 0,164 0,156 0,291 0,6088621 *** 0,2048415 2,970 0,003
countrydummies yes yes
Observation 6629 4412
Pseudo R-squared 0,09 0,13
23Table VI: Country-specific Results
Robust Robust Robust Robust
use Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
age 0-5 -0,124 * 0,073 0,089 -0,117 0,073 0,110 -0,125 * 0,073 0,089 -0,118 0,073 0,109
age 5-15 -0,020 0,062 0,748 -0,013 0,062 0,831 -0,020 0,062 0,746 -0,013 0,062 0,835
age 15-30 -0,154 ** 0,077 0,045 -0,149 * 0,077 0,053 -0,153 ** 0,077 0,047 -0,153 ** 0,077 0,046
small firm -0,481 *** 0,040 0,000 -0,482 *** 0,040 0,000 -0,453 *** 0,046 0,000 -0,481 *** 0,040 0,000
privatized firm 0,073 0,054 0,180 0,071 0,054 0,189 0,071 0,054 0,190 0,078 0,054 0,149
state-owned firm -0,554 *** 0,070 0,000 -0,556 *** 0,070 0,000 -0,550 *** 0,070 0,000 -0,549 *** 0,070 0,000
transparency 0,170 *** 0,025 0,000 0,196 *** 0,027 0,000 0,171 *** 0,025 0,000 0,168 *** 0,025 0,000
profit 0,161 *** 0,045 0,000 0,162 *** 0,045 0,000 0,160 *** 0,045 0,000 0,163 *** 0,045 0,000
sec2 -0,151 ** 0,067 0,023 -0,152 ** 0,067 0,023 -0,149 ** 0,067 0,025 -0,151 ** 0,067 0,023
sec3 -0,146 *** 0,042 0,001 -0,147 *** 0,042 0,000 -0,145 *** 0,042 0,001 -0,143 *** 0,042 0,001
sec4 -0,210 *** 0,077 0,007 -0,210 *** 0,078 0,007 -0,211 *** 0,077 0,006 -0,206 *** 0,077 0,008
sec5 -0,194 *** 0,048 0,000 -0,192 *** 0,048 0,000 -0,194 *** 0,048 0,000 -0,193 *** 0,048 0,000
sec6 -0,527 *** 0,070 0,000 -0,526 *** 0,070 0,000 -0,526 *** 0,070 0,000 -0,524 *** 0,070 0,000
sec7 -0,494 *** 0,086 0,000 -0,496 *** 0,086 0,000 -0,490 *** 0,086 0,000 -0,490 *** 0,086 0,000
logGNI -0,007 0,029 0,801 -0,007 0,029 0,816 -0,008 0,029 0,789 -0,016 0,029 0,594
inflation -0,002 0,004 0,529 -0,001 0,004 0,709 -0,002 0,004 0,531 0,000 0,004 0,900
foreignbank 0,002 * 0,001 0,069 0,002 ** 0,001 0,037 0,002 * 0,001 0,072 0,002 ** 0,001 0,027
creditrights 0,012 0,010 0,228 0,010 0,010 0,334 0,012 0,010 0,233 0,005 0,010 0,655
log_enfdays 0,032 0,043 0,459 0,036 0,043 0,407 0,032 0,043 0,458 0,030 0,043 0,485
information sharing 0,055 *** 0,014 0,000 -0,001 0,026 0,960 0,077 *** 0,022 0,000 0,082 *** 0,020 0,000
info_opaque 0,067 ** 0,027 0,012
info_small -0,031 0,023 0,188
info_weakcr -0,042 ** 0,021 0,049
_cons -0,078 0,289 0,787 -0,136 0,291 0,639 -0,093 0,289 0,747 -0,020 0,291 0,945
Observation 6629 6629 6629 6629
Pseudo R-squared 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06
Robust Robust Robust Robust
access Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
age 0-5 -0,055 0,098 0,571 -0,047 0,098 0,628 -0,055 0,098 0,573 -0,053 0,098 0,590
age 5-15 0,086 0,084 0,308 0,093 0,084 0,271 0,086 0,084 0,306 0,088 0,084 0,295
age 15-30 -0,101 0,102 0,324 -0,092 0,102 0,369 -0,100 0,102 0,329 -0,100 0,102 0,329
small firm -0,716 *** 0,056 0,000 -0,718 *** 0,056 0,000 -0,701 *** 0,063 0,000 -0,716 *** 0,056 0,000
privatized firm 0,121 0,075 0,109 0,119 0,075 0,114 0,120 0,075 0,110 0,122 0,075 0,104
state-owned firm -0,474 *** 0,096 0,000 -0,476 *** 0,096 0,000 -0,472 *** 0,096 0,000 -0,472 *** 0,096 0,000
transparency 0,274 *** 0,035 0,000 0,299 *** 0,037 0,000 0,274 *** 0,035 0,000 0,273 *** 0,035 0,000
profit 0,351 *** 0,056 0,000 0,350 *** 0,056 0,000 0,350 *** 0,056 0,000 0,351 *** 0,056 0,000
sec2 -0,165 * 0,087 0,057 -0,166 * 0,087 0,057 -0,164 * 0,087 0,059 -0,166 * 0,087 0,056
sec3 -0,122 ** 0,054 0,024 -0,125 ** 0,054 0,022 -0,122 ** 0,054 0,025 -0,121 ** 0,054 0,025
sec4 -0,129 0,104 0,213 -0,130 0,104 0,209 -0,130 0,104 0,209 -0,128 0,103 0,217
sec5 -0,015 0,063 0,813 -0,013 0,063 0,835 -0,015 0,063 0,812 -0,015 0,063 0,813
sec6 -0,259 *** 0,095 0,006 -0,253 *** 0,094 0,007 -0,259 *** 0,095 0,006 -0,258 *** 0,094 0,006
sec7 -0,096 0,126 0,446 -0,098 0,126 0,437 -0,094 0,126 0,453 -0,095 0,126 0,451
logGNI 0,052 0,036 0,152 0,053 0,037 0,147 0,052 0,036 0,155 0,049 0,037 0,181
inflation -0,009 ** 0,004 0,047 -0,008 * 0,004 0,071 -0,009 ** 0,004 0,047 -0,008 * 0,005 0,091
foreignbank 0,001 0,001 0,437 0,001 0,001 0,332 0,001 0,001 0,451 0,001 0,001 0,394
creditrights 0,035 *** 0,013 0,008 0,032 ** 0,013 0,013 0,034 *** 0,013 0,008 0,032 ** 0,014 0,020
log_enfdays 0,059 0,054 0,275 0,062 0,054 0,250 0,059 0,054 0,269 0,058 0,054 0,281
information sharing 0,047 *** 0,018 0,008 -0,020 0,037 0,587 0,060 * 0,032 0,058 0,056 ** 0,026 0,034
info_opaque 0,077 ** 0,038 0,045
info_small -0,017 0,034 0,611
info_weakcr -0,014 0,029 0,637
_cons -0,333 0,362 0,359 -0,386 0,364 0,289 -0,345 0,364 0,343 -0,311 0,367 0,396
Observation 4412 4412 4412 4412
Pseudo R-squared 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
24Table VII: Results of Heckman Selection Model
Robust Robust Robust Robust
Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z
access
age 0-5 -0,020 0,091 0,824 -0,016 0,092 0,862 -0,018 0,091 0,842 -0,015 0,091 0,872
age 5-15 0,116 0,078 0,136 0,120 0,078 0,125 0,118 0,078 0,131 0,121 0,078 0,121
age 15-30 -0,041 0,096 0,671 -0,036 0,096 0,706 -0,037 0,096 0,700 -0,038 0,096 0,695
small firm -0,576 *** 0,065 0,000 -0,580 *** 0,065 0,000 -0,544 *** 0,067 0,000 -0,573 *** 0,064 0,000
privatized firm 0,089 0,070 0,201 0,089 0,070 0,205 0,088 0,070 0,207 0,092 0,069 0,187
state-owned firm -0,241 ** 0,103 0,019 -0,245 ** 0,104 0,018 -0,231 ** 0,102 0,023 -0,234 ** 0,102 0,022
transparency 0,239 *** 0,033 0,000 0,257 *** 0,035 0,000 0,239 *** 0,033 0,000 0,236 *** 0,033 0,000
profit 0,326 *** 0,052 0,000 0,328 *** 0,052 0,000 0,324 *** 0,052 0,000 0,326 *** 0,052 0,000
sec2 -0,105 0,082 0,202 -0,107 0,083 0,195 -0,101 0,082 0,217 -0,105 0,082 0,202
sec3 -0,081 0,051 0,112 -0,084 0,051 0,101 -0,080 0,051 0,116 -0,079 0,051 0,120
sec4 -0,039 0,098 0,693 -0,040 0,099 0,683 -0,039 0,098 0,687 -0,035 0,098 0,717
sec5 0,067 0,059 0,257 0,067 0,060 0,260 0,069 0,059 0,242 0,069 0,059 0,242
sec6 0,013 0,098 0,894 0,014 0,098 0,888 0,020 0,097 0,838 0,019 0,097 0,846
sec7 0,129 0,123 0,294 0,125 0,124 0,314 0,136 0,121 0,263 0,134 0,122 0,270
logGNI 0,043 0,032 0,175 0,044 0,032 0,173 0,043 0,032 0,181 0,038 0,032 0,234
inflation -0,007 * 0,004 0,063 -0,007 * 0,004 0,087 -0,007 * 0,004 0,063 -0,006 0,004 0,156
foreignbank 0,001 0,001 0,512 0,001 0,001 0,416 0,001 0,001 0,548 0,001 0,001 0,418
creditrights 0,032 *** 0,012 0,005 0,031 *** 0,012 0,008 0,032 *** 0,011 0,005 0,028 ** 0,012 0,020
log_enfdays 0,054 0,047 0,254 0,056 0,047 0,237 0,055 0,047 0,240 0,052 0,047 0,265
information sharing 0,042 *** 0,016 0,007 -0,006 0,034 0,854 0,069 *** 0,030 0,020 0,058 ** 0,023 0,013
info_opaque 0,054 0,035 0,117
info_small -0,034 0,031 0,276
info_weakcr -0,023 0,026 0,360
_cons -0,058 0,322 0,856 -0,096 0,325 0,768 -0,077 0,321 0,810 -0,016 0,325 0,960
need
profit -0,082 * 0,044 0,062 -0,082 * 0,044 0,062 -0,082 * 0,044 0,063 -0,082 * 0,044 0,063
privatized firm 0,051 0,054 0,345 0,051 0,054 0,346 0,051 0,054 0,346 0,051 0,054 0,346
state-owned firm -0,413 *** 0,067 0,000 -0,413 *** 0,067 0,000 -0,413 *** 0,067 0,000 -0,413 *** 0,067 0,000
age 0-5 -0,076 0,072 0,293 -0,076 0,072 0,292 -0,075 0,072 0,298 -0,076 0,072 0,295
age 5-15 -0,090 0,062 0,149 -0,090 0,062 0,148 -0,089 0,062 0,151 -0,089 0,062 0,150
age 15-30 -0,148 * 0,076 0,052 -0,149 * 0,076 0,051 -0,148 * 0,076 0,053 -0,148 * 0,076 0,053
small firm -0,204 *** 0,039 0,000 -0,204 *** 0,039 0,000 -0,204 *** 0,039 0,000 -0,204 *** 0,039 0,000
competition 0,066 *** 0,014 0,000 0,066 *** 0,014 0,000 0,065 *** 0,014 0,000 0,065 *** 0,014 0,000
investment 0,155 *** 0,033 0,000 0,155 *** 0,033 0,000 0,155 *** 0,033 0,000 0,156 *** 0,033 0,000
sec2 -0,104 0,066 0,115 -0,104 0,066 0,115 -0,104 0,066 0,116 -0,104 0,066 0,116
sec3 -0,076 * 0,041 0,066 -0,076 * 0,041 0,066 -0,076 * 0,041 0,066 -0,076 * 0,041 0,066
sec4 -0,185 ** 0,075 0,014 -0,185 ** 0,075 0,014 -0,184 ** 0,075 0,014 -0,184 ** 0,075 0,014
sec5 -0,242 *** 0,046 0,000 -0,242 *** 0,046 0,000 -0,242 *** 0,046 0,000 -0,242 *** 0,046 0,000
sec6 -0,507 *** 0,064 0,000 -0,507 *** 0,064 0,000 -0,507 *** 0,064 0,000 -0,507 *** 0,064 0,000
sec7 -0,550 *** 0,081 0,000 -0,550 *** 0,081 0,000 -0,550 *** 0,081 0,000 -0,550 *** 0,081 0,000
_cons 0,626 *** 0,087 0,000 0,626 *** 0,087 0,000 0,626 *** 0,087 0,000 0,627 *** 0,087 0,000
/athrho -0,891 *** 0,272 0,001 -0,872 *** 0,273 0,001 -0,920 *** 0,270 0,001 -0,917 *** 0,275 0,001
Observation 6659 6659 6659 6659
Wald chi2 221,89 221,89 225,10 224,70










[1] loan [3] no loan, because discouraged
[2] no loan, because rejected [4] no loan, because no need
Figure 1: Comparison of Access and Use